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In addition to well-documented negative effects (e.g., environmental degradation
and ethnic conflict) Indonesia’s central government programs of transmigration and
industrial forest management subvert indigenous rights (even if unintentionally)
through appropriation of forested land and migrant subsidies. Although central
control can be an effective strategy for resource management, Indonesia’s programs
have undercut their own objectives and may interact synergistically to increase
population pressure, reduce available land, and intensify land use conflicts on the
outer islands. Empirical data are needed to evaluate the interactions between
transmigration and forest conversion and to design appropriate management strat-
egies that incorporate local as well as central controls.
KEY WORDS: transmigration; logging concessions; Dayak; ethnic conflict; resource degra-
dation.
INTRODUCTION
Environmental management and community development in the tro-
pics involve multiple stakeholders and a complex suite of interdisciplinary
issues surrounding contested land use claims. Such issues include increas-
ing population pressures; industrialization of logging concessions, planta-
tions, agriculture and mining; unequal access to forest resources and to
policies affecting those resources; changes in subsistence economies;
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environmental degradation; and social unrest. These large-scale difficulties
arise as people’s lives and livelihoods are changed, in this case inadver-
tently. In Indonesia, uneven population distribution, great differences in
power and influence among socio-economic groups, and history of corrupt
authoritarian governance (1967–1999), have led to severe problems of re-
source management, access, and control.
Increasingly, international attention has focused on Indonesia’s envi-
ronmental crises, because they have major implications for regional stability
and ethnic conflict. Two of Indonesia’s major government programs,
transmigration and industrial forest conversion, have led to well-docu-
mented, unintended consequences of environmental degradation and
ethnic unrest. These two programs may interact synergistically to intensify
land use conflicts and disenfranchise local forest-dependent communities.
While central control is often viewed as the best way to manage natural
resources and multi-state issues, there must be opportunities for public
participation and checks and balances to ensure sound management.
CENTRAL GOVERNMENTAL CONTROL IN INDONESIA
Indonesia is a nation of 17,000 islands, with hundreds of ethnic groups
and languages, rich biodiversity, and abundant natural resources, including
timber, oil, natural gas, and minerals. The diverse biogeography of these
islands has determined much of the country’s political, social, and eco-
nomic development. United under Dutch colonial rule, the islands have
remained together as one country though a system of strong central gov-
ernment control that includes military might, ideological propaganda,
population management, and central control of natural resources. Since
independence in 1949, Indonesia’s presidents have enjoyed near dictator-
ship, and elite decision-makers from Java have determined the course of
local affairs throughout the archipelago.
Although central control has, for the most part, successfully maintained
Indonesia’s national identity, it has also been linked to high levels of re-
gional inequality (Shankar & Shah, 2003). The central government programs
of transmigration and industrial forest conversion stand out as policies that
have led to corruption, mismanagement of resources, and ethnic strife. For
example, transmigration, state-sponsored migration from the densely-pop-
ulated inner islands (Java, Bali, and Madura) to the sparsely-populated outer
islands (Sumatra, Kalimantan, and West Papua), has led to widespread
ethnic conflict and environmental degradation. Indonesia’s central man-
agement of natural resources has had grave impacts on the ecology of the
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outer islands, as well as the livelihoods of rural, forest-dependent com-
munities. In this review, I explore the consequences of and interactions
between these two major central government policies, transmigration and
industrial forest conversion.
TRANSMIGRATION
In response to increasing population pressure, developing countries
around the world are encouraging population redistribution, often through
government-sponsored resettlement programs such as the well-publicized
programs in Brazil and Indonesia (Desbarats, 1990; Ilchman, Lasswell,
Montgomery, & Wiener, 1975). In general, Indonesia’s programs have been
unsuccessful in achieving governmental goals of population reduction
(Oey, 1981). Further, the increasing population pressures and cultural dis-
placement associated with the transmigration program have led to envi-
ronmental degradation (Fearnside, 1997; Lumbranraja et al., 1998) and
ethnic conflicts throughout transmigrant areas.
History and Goals
The population of Indonesia, currently around 235 million (CIA, 2003),
is unevenly distributed. The ‘‘outer’’ island provinces, such as West Kali-
mantan and West Papua, have extremely low population densities (12 and
6 persons per km2, respectively; BPS, 2004). In contrast, the central islands
of Java and Bali, with their rich volcanic soils, can support more than
1000 people per km2 (BPS, 2004; Hugo, 1980). Responding to this extreme
variation, Indonesia’s population policy has focused on redistribution.
In 1905, the Dutch began a ‘‘colonization’’ program to resettle people
from the inner islands to the outer islands, primarily to provide cheap
plantation labor (Abdoellah, 1987; Dawson, 1994). After independence in
1949, the Indonesian government continued the program, renamed
‘‘transmigration,’’ to alleviate population pressure and promote national
unity (Elmhirst, 1999; Hull & Hatmadji, 1990). Government funding is di-
rected almost exclusively at very poor, rural inhabitants of the inner islands
(Zakaria, 1996). Families are subsidized for up to five years, after which
time they are considered independent and are ‘‘turned over’’ to the local
governments to be integrated into local villages (Fasbender & Erbe, 1990).
People are motivated to move for diverse but predictable reasons:
economic hardship and unequal access to resources; ecological deteriora-
tion; improved communication and transportation; and desire for better
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opportunities in education and social services. Generally, migrants are af-
fected by a ‘‘sense of relative deprivation in some important values and the
belief that this cannot be overcome at home but might be overcome
somewhere else’’ (Abdoellah, 1987, 182). On the island of Java, land is a
precious commodity, and land tenure is uncertain, so the chance to secure a
plot through the transmigration program is appealing (Fasbender & Erbe,
1990).
In South and Central Kalimantan, most migrants were from the poorest
households in Java, and had less education than the national average
(Karyono, Abdoellah, & Siswandono, 1980). Land ownership and willing-
ness to migrate were negatively related; people who lived in villages with a
shortage of land, and unequal access to land, were most likely to migrate.
Most transmigrants are farm laborers, tenant farmers, or farmers with plots
too small to make a living (Dawson, 1994).
Migrants are usually unfamiliar with the types of soils and appropriate
farming techniques in their new region. The land in transmigration settle-
ments is usually poor soil, ill-suited to the wet rice cultivation that trans-
migrants are used to and that the government promotes. Migrants are
usually able to obtain reasonable rice yields at first, but after several years
the soils become depleted and the yields fall. In a study in Sumatra, 65% of
the transmigrant population was living in poverty (Holden, Hvoslef, &
Simanjuntak, 1995).
Effects and Consequences
I compiled data from relevant published studies, and from the 1980
national census. There are no regular publications of birth and death reg-
istration statistics in Indonesia, as in most developing countries, so
demographers rely on decennial population censuses and intercensal sur-
veys, both of which estimate fertility only indirectly (Hull & Dasvarma,
1987; Suharto & Cho, 1978). Census data are grouped into subprovincial
areas, and it is difficult to get data for smaller regions such as regencies,
municipalities, or subdistricts. ‘‘Source areas’’ were considered to be any
parts of Java, Madura, and Bali; ‘‘destination areas’’ were well-known
transmigration settlements, including Lampung in southern Sumatra and
West Kalimantan in Borneo.
Population redistribution: In her study of fertility in transmigrant com-
munities, Oey (1981) found that in relocating families to relieve population
pressure on Java, the government increased pressure on the outer islands.
While the overall density of Sumatra is about 90 people per km2, the density
of Lampung, a large transmigrant destination, is 200 people per km2. Oey
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found that fertility was higher in the transmigrant community of Lampung
than in either the home communities on Java or the non-migrant commu-
nities of Lampung. Similarly, Clauss et al. (1987) report that from 1971 to
1980, the growth rate in transmigrant communities in Sumatra and Kali-
mantan was almost 20% higher than the natural growth rate in these regions.
These increases in fertility suggest that the transmigration program is sub-
verting its own goals as well as the goals of the family planning program
(Ilchman et al., 1975).
Traditional demographic theories do not fit the transmigration data:
there are no links between observed fertility differences and any demo-
graphic and social indicators, such as patterns of marriage, child mortality,
family planning, or education (Oey, 1981). Demographic transition theories
have often fallen short in explaining fertility changes (Cohen, 1995; Robey,
Rutstein, & Morris, 1993), and it is important to explore additional ap-
proaches. One such approach, based on evolutionary principals, predicts
that fertility will increase with increasing resources, or when people per-
ceive that their income and resources are favorable compared to others
(Abernathy & Penaloza, 2002; Clarke & Low, 2001; Low, 1993, 2001; Low,
Clarke, & Lockridge, 1992). Fertility should decline when parents can im-
prove the net success of their offspring by investing more in each child and
having fewer children (Low et al., 1992, Low, 2001). A sense of uncertainty
will also affect reproductive decisions (Geronimus, 1996; Rank, 1989), and
there is both theoretical and empirical support for the idea that families in
Indonesia will have more children to mitigate risks associated with a poor,
rural farming existence (Hull, 1976; Jones, 1976). Women’s perceptions
and decision-making power, in particular, are important determinants of
fertility. Some researchers have proposed that women’s relative power
within the family increases with migration, as the couple distances itself
from their families, and particularly, from the husband’s family (Williams,
1986).
Thus, one would predict that fertility is higher among migrants who
moved with expectations of a better life, and who benefit from more re-
sources in the form of government subsidies. This is consistent with ob-
served patterns (Figure 1; Clauss, Evers, & Gerke, 1987; Oey, 1981), which
indicate that age-specific fertility is higher in settlement areas than in source
areas. If, after several years, the quality of life remains higher in the new
environs, migrant fertility will remain higher than fertility in source areas. If,
on the other hand, quality of life is poorer than expected, migrant fertility
should drop below local fertility levels. In Lampung during 1976–79, there
was an initial rise in age-specific fertility followed by a decline (Figure 2).





















Figure 1. Age-specific fertility rate (ASFR) between 1976 and 1979, the
early years of the transmigration program. Data are from the 1980 Census.
Central Java (Ctrl Java) and Bali are ‘‘source areas’’ in the densely populated
inner islands. Lampung, Sumatra, and West Kalimantan (West Kal) are



















Figure 2. Age-specific fertility rate (ASFR) between 1967 and 1979, the
early years of the transmigration program, in Lampung, a ‘‘destination area’’
in southern Sumatra. Data are from the 1980 Census.
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significant and if they correlate with successful arrival followed by hardship
several years later.
National unity. Despite the government goal of integration and unifi-
cation, transmigrant communities on the outer islands usually remain seg-
regated from native residents. They maintain their own cultural and
agricultural practices, and the original inhabitants often resent the govern-
ment subsidies that migrants receive (Oey, 1981). Most migrants bring into
the new communities the Javanese system of governance, perpetuating the
idea that transmigration is a form of cultural imperialism, another mecha-
nism for the ‘‘Javanization’’ of Indonesia (Elmhirst, 2000). Migrants compete
for land and resources with local residents; and migrants often seek work in
industrial plantations, which is viewed by local residents as stealing both
land and jobs. Cultural clashes and resource shortages have led to severe
ethnic conflict in transmigration areas, such as the violence between the
Dayak (local residents) and Madurese (migrants) in Kalimantan. National
unity is strained, rather than promoted, by the transmigration program.
INDUSTRIAL FOREST CONVERSION
Concessions, Plantations, and Forest-dependent Communities
Forest resources are central to the economy of Indonesia, as well as to
the livelihoods of rural forest-dependent people. In 1960, the Indonesian
government proclaimed that all natural resources were subject to state
control and management (Basic Agrarian Law; State Gazette 160, No. 104,
Law No. 5). In the late 1960s, Suharto (Indonesian president, 1966–1998)
partitioned the lands of the outer islands—Sumatra, Kalimantan (Indonesian
Borneo), and Irian Jaya—and granted extraction rights to industrial logging
companies across almost 80% of the forested areas (Broad & Cavanagh,
1994; Curran et al., 1999). Logging companies were granted 35-year leases,
after which time they could renew the lease or abandon the land. Over
time, as leases are abandoned, deforested areas have been turned into
industrial plantations, primarily oil palm monocultures. Almost 25% of the
land in West Kalimantan, for example, was allotted to industrial plantations
in 2002 (Curran et al., 2004).
In Kalimantan, land use issues among multiple-stakeholders, including
concessions, plantations, protected areas, subsistence communities, and
transmigrants, are particularly contentious. The many indigenous, forest-
dependent communities in interior Borneo are collectively referred to as the
Dayak peoples (MacKinnon, Hatta, Halim, & Mangahik, 1997; Wadley,
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Pierce Colfer, & Hood, 1997). Living in sedentary villages, Dayaks practice
composite agrarian strategies, including shifting subsistence agriculture,
gathering and cultivating forest products, trade, and wage labor.
When the government apportioned its natural resources in the 1960s,
the majority of indigenous communities on the outer islands were sub-
sumed within logging concessions. Traditional adat rights—resource rights
that are determined and controlled by communities without formal title-–
were recognized only insofar as they did not conflict with national laws.
Under the Basic Agrarian Law, all land must be registered, and land without
title is assumed to belong to the state (MacAndrews, 1986). Within the
concessions, local communities nominally retain rights to land they have
already cleared and to important honey and fruit trees. However, these
rights are rarely enforced (Barber, 1998), and communities are left to
negotiate more concrete protections for their lands on their own. Local
residents are not allowed to cut timber in any logging blocks; this right is
reserved solely for the concessionaire.
The concession system was designed to facilitate the efficient extrac-
tion, marketing, and sale of timber, and it has achieved this goal. Today the
forestry sector is one of the most important to Indonesia’s economy; over the
past 20 years, Indonesia’s timber exports exceeded those of Africa and Latin
America combined (Curran et al., 2004). A more covert but equally far-
reaching goal of the system was to reward wealthy and politically influential
allies with lucrative business deals. By 1994, after years of consolidations
and mergers, 25 individuals controlled rights to over 60 million ha of forests
(Gunawan, Thamrin, & Suhendar, 1999).
Effects and Consequences
Inconsistencies between official land use policies and actual outcomes
in forested areas have existed for decades. It is common, for example, for
large areas of the outer islands to be officially designated as both production
forest and protected forest. These inconsistencies may represent conflicting
priorities, lack of information, or poor communication, but in practice they
have allowed the government to claim that it is conscientiously caring for its
forests and people, while elite interests profit at the expense of local com-
munities and the environment. Rife corruption, perverse incentives, and
lack of accountability have led to a system of forest exploitation that is
unsustainable and inequitable.
Illegal logging. Currently, illegal logging accounts for 55–75% of
industrial wood production in Indonesia (CIFOR, 2002), with profits going
primarily to private individuals and companies rather than the state. The
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efficient concession system, high potential profits, and total lack of legal
enforcement have led to widespread deforestation on the outer islands.
Protected lowland areas, rich in valuable timber species such as the
Dipterocarpaceae, have been particularly devastated (Curran et al., 2004).
The central government continues to shape the debate by publicizing
local swidden agriculturalists as the primary agents of deforestation. The
government, which prefers uses of land that provide greater monetary return
to those with political power (Gunawan et al., 1999), often promotes
development schemes based on erroneous notions of the ecological impact
of shifting agriculture (Cairns & Garrity, 1999; de Jong, 1997; Dove, 1986;
Fox, 2000).
Subsistence strategies. The environmental consequences of industrial
logging and plantations are generally acknowledged, although typically
underestimated. Less commonly assessed are the effects of deforestation on
local communities. Concessions reduce the amount of land available to
local communities—communities that have lived in these watersheds for
generations—and at the same time increase population pressure, deplete
resources, and degrade the landscape.
Longitudinal surveys indicate that Dayak families living within a log-
ging concession in Central Kalimantan have experienced declines in rice
harvests. Rice self-sufficiency, defined as the ability to harvest enough rice
to sustain a family for 12 months or more, declined significantly over a 10-
year study period that encompassed the onset or intensification of industrial
logging activities (O’Connor & Curran, in preparation).
Concessions also contribute to wildlife population declines, through
habitat loss and increased hunting (Robinson & Bennett, 2000). Dayak
hunters perceive a decrease in prey species since logging activities com-
menced, despite a significant decrease in the proportion of local residents
who hunt for subsistence. The total number of hunters in the area, however,
more than doubled over the decade, because concession employees hunt
throughout the logged and unlogged areas (O’Connor & Curran, in prepa-
ration).
Increased reliance on concessions and wage labor. The logging and
plantation companies employ hundreds of Javanese as skilled laborers;
these migrant workers live on the concession compounds in barracks, often
with their families. Concomitant with the influx of outsiders, Dayak villages
have been undergoing a transition into a market economy. Concession
employees and their families create a large demand for a wide range of
goods, and they must buy almost all their food from concession stores or
local communities. The concession facilitates this market system by sending
a truck to each village once a week to transport villagers and their
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wares—vegetables, eggs, freshly hunted meat and other forest products—to
the logging camps.
Local Dayak residents often work for the company, although generally
in unskilled positions for relatively low pay. However, the company has
brought unprecedented opportunities for steady cash income, allowing
some local residents to earn their livelihoods outside the agricultural sector.
There is also increasing potential for socio-economic inequality within
villages, as some families earn more wages than others.
Timber concessions are required to invest in development of villages
located within and near the concession borders. In Kalimantan, where the
vast majority of the land is designated as production forest and managed by
private companies, the private sector has taken on the traditional govern-
mental role of providing community development and extension services.
Concessions provide electricity, roads, health clinics, schools and teachers.
In turn, these communities feel indebted to non-local, private companies,
whose primary interest is maximizing resource extraction and for whom
there is little political, economic, or legal accountability.
Companies pay village leaders and other powerful local residents to
ensure their cooperation (Dove & Kammen, 2001). These ‘‘wages’’ are not
fixed: the company pays more to leaders from whom the company most
wants compliance, such as those in villages near logging activities. These
pay-offs alter the balance of power in villages, because the companies
usually pay the government-approved representative (kepala desa) rather
than the locally chosen leader (kepala adat). The provincial government
carefully selects the pool of kepala desas (Alcorn, Bamba, Masiun, Natalia,
& Royo, 2003), and those who are chosen are often not respected in the
village. Historically, Dayak societies have not been defined by classes or
rank. However, as measures of resources change from subsistence value,
such as amount of rice or hunted meat, to cash income and its attendant
purchasing power, new dynamics are emerging in these villages. Outside
income may become a new ‘‘culturally defined value’’ (Cronk, 1991).
Ethnic conflicts. Market interactions with the concession are creating
unequal access to power and distribution of resources, both within and
among Dayak villages and among local communities, migrants, and cor-
porate interests. In addition to the migrant logging concession workers,
industrial plantations often employ large numbers of transmigrant workers.
Increasing numbers of outsiders lead to degraded landscapes, because
outsiders’ interests are short-term, and their knowledge of local ecology is
limited. Rising population pressure has resulted in decreases in faunal re-
sources and in available land. Local residents, who do not reap benefits
from industrial resource exploitation and are often powerless to resist or
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enforce their rights, are increasingly frustrated and angry. Conflicts between
local communities and logging concessions over land, jobs, and other re-
sources have become common. For example, in West Kalimantan several
logging camps were burned by local residents, and there has been physical
violence between locals and loggers.
CONCLUSION AND IMPLICATIONS
Despite the fact that many countries, including the United States,
acknowledge that there are conditions under which central management of
natural resources can be most effective, Indonesia’s version of centralized
control has not been successful at protecting forests or reducing resource
demands. Lack of control by local resource-users routinely leads to over-
exploitation (Ostrom, 1990), as has occurred on the outer islands. Trans-
migration and industrial forest conversion, and the interactions between the
two programs, have led to undesirable local outcomes, including increased
population pressure on the forest resources of the outer islands, depleted
natural resources, and ethnic conflict. Both programs engender state-
dependent communities, and migrants and residents alike will be left with
few resources once state subsidies expire.
Transmigration to less-populated areas is not a panacea for either
Indonesia’s population crisis or for the individual families that choose to
move. Transmigration settlements often become nearly as densely popu-
lated as the inner islands, feeding criticism that the program is just a method
of moving rural poverty away from Java. Transmigration fails to provide the
security people seek: there is still no reliable system of ownership or pos-
session, and the settlers face difficult conditions: poor soils, ethnic conflicts
with the local population, and limited access to social services and health
services (Economist, 1994).
The Indonesian government, and foreign development agencies such
as the World Bank, still support the transmigration program—despite its
limited success, international criticism, and problems of ethnic conflict and
ecological degradation (Fearnside, 1997; McBeth, 1994). A 1996 govern-
ment propaganda pamphlet confirms that the government’s goals for
transmigration into the next century are similar to the historical goals of
reducing population pressure and distributing population more evenly
(Zakaria, 1996).
Industrial forest conversion has affected the livelihoods of local sub-
sistence communities, who have been forced to enter a market economy as
local forest resources disappear. Forest-dependent communities have
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become company-dependent communities. Industrial logging concessions
are abandoning sites as their leases expire or as their lands lose productivity.
Local residents who recently converted to a cash economy will have to
adapt again in response to the loss of markets, transportation, and forest
resources. A potential cycle of dependency has been created, and com-
munities may face resource shortages once the concessions depart.
Recognizing the limitations of central control, Indonesia recently be-
gan to shift power to local units of government. However, decentraliza-
tion—the major reorganization of Indonesia’s government to devolve power
and control to the district level—has exacerbated the confusion over control
of forest resources. There are at least 15 different statutes and regulations
that apply to the control and management of forested land in Indonesia
(Gunawan et al., 1999). This morass of legislation is difficult to understand
and to enforce, especially for rural communities with little access to edu-
cation or formal legal information. Decentralization to district and muni-
cipal governments may bring more problems than solutions (Thorburn,
2002). Indeed, illegal logging has flourished under the new regional
autonomy laws (Casson & Obidzinski, 2002; Curran et al. 2004), and
decentralization has led to increased ethnic and economic tensions (Hugo,
2002).
Solutions to environmental and ethnic conflicts will require an
understanding of the behavioral ecology as well as the political ecology of
resource use, and a balance of local and central control. Influences on local
livelihoods of large-scale land use, population movements, and economic
shifts are as important as the changes in behavior within local communities
(Steinberg, 1998). Although complete decentralization of resource man-
agement may not be appropriate for Indonesia, some local control or
feedback must be built into any effective management regime. This review
has highlighted the impacts of transmigration and forest conversion on land
use and forest-dependent communities. Empirical data are needed to elu-
cidate the extent of the interactions between these programs, and to assess
how the apparent synergies affect access to land, jobs, and forest resources
for local residents and migrants alike.
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